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Some opponents of allowing younger workers
to privately invest a portion of their Social Security
taxes through individual accounts have suggested
that most or all of Social Security’s financial prob-
lems can be solved if the current cap on income
subject to the Social Security payroll tax is raised or
removed altogether. Indeed, public opinion polls
show widespread public support for the idea. Even
President Bush appears open to the idea, although
only in the context of larger reforms that would
also include the creation of personal accounts.
However, removing the cap would create the
largest tax increase in U.S. history: $1.3 trillion over
the first 10 years. Even increasing the cap to cover
the first $150,000 of wages would amount to $384
billion in new taxes. It would give the United States
one of the highest marginal tax rates in the indus-
trialized world, with the potential for severely dis-
rupting economic growth.
Yet in exchange for this massive tax increase,
Social Security would gain only an additional
seven years of cash-flow solvency. In the end, pro-
posals for changing the taxable wage cap are all
pain and no gain. With a viable alternative—creat-
ing personal accounts—Congress should not go
down this road.
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Introduction
Some opponents of allowing younger
workers to privately invest a portion of their
Social Security taxes through individual
accounts have suggested that most or all of
Social Security’s financial problems can be
solved if the current cap on income subject to
the Social Security payroll tax is raised or
removed altogether. Indeed, public opinion
polls show widespread public support for the
idea.1 Even President Bush appears open to
the idea, although only in the context of larg-
er reforms that would also include the cre-
ation of personal accounts.2 However, a clos-
er look shows that this proposal, which
would create the largest tax increase in U.S.
history, would actually do very little to
improve Social Security’s finances. 
When Franklin Roosevelt first proposed
Social Security in 1935, there was no explicit
cap on the wages subject to the tax. However,
because the law was primarily designed to pro-
vide retirement benefits for low-income work-
ers, nonmanual laborers with incomes of
more than $3,000 were exempted from the
program. The final legislation, however, in an
attempt to make the program more universal,
eliminated the exemption for nonmanual
laborers, while formally capping taxable wages
at $3,000.3
That $3,000 cap remained in place until
1951 when Congress, faced with a need for
additional Social Security revenue, increased
it for the first time to $3,600. Between then
and 1974, Congress voted seven more times
to raise the cap, until it reached $13,200 in
1974. At that point, Congress established an
automatic mechanism to increase the cap
annually by a percentage equal to the growth
in average wages. Congress overrode those
automatic provisions in 1977 to increase the
wage base above the scheduled level for the
years 1979–81. Thereafter, the increase in the
wage cap returned to the automatic formula
established in 1974 (Table 1).4
Currently, workers pay Social Security
taxes on the first $90,000 of wage income.
Income above that level is exempt from
Social Security taxes (though not Medicare
payroll taxes).5 Approximately 84 percent of
all wage income earned in the United States
falls under that cap and is subject to the tax.
Advocates of raising or eliminating the cap
on payroll taxes often suggest that the current
level of covered wages is significantly below
the rate of roughly 90 percent of covered earn-
ings subject to the tax in 1983, at the time of
the Greenspan Commission’s reform. What
they fail to note, however, is that the 1983 rate
was unnaturally high. In fact, as Figure 1
shows, from 1945 to 1965 the proportion of
wages covered by the payroll tax declined
steadily, from 88 percent to roughly 71 per-
cent. However, beginning in 1965, as the cap
was gradually increased, it reached a high of 90
percent in 1983. Since that time, it has again
begun to decline but remains above the
post–World War II average of 82.9 percent.6
For advocates of changing the cap, there are
two main policy questions. First, should the cap
be removed altogether or simply raised?
Although some groups, such as the Economic
Policy Institute, the 2030 Center, and the
National Council of Women’s Organizations,
have suggested the cap should be completely
eliminated, most have argued in favor of
increasing it, generally to a level that would
cover 90 percent of wage payroll.7 That would
be approximately $150,000 today. 
Second, should the increased taxes count
toward increased benefits? Today, workers
theoretically earn some benefits in return for
every dollar paid into the system.8 Therefore,
raising or eliminating the cap to subject more
wages to taxation would, under current for-
mulas, mean that the worker would receive
more benefits. It would not be a dollar-for-dol-
lar increase, because Social Security’s progres-
sive benefit formula provides workers with
only 15 cents on the dollar for taxes paid on
wages above $3,779 per month. Still, the pro-
vision of increased benefits in exchange for
increased taxes would somewhat reduce the
revenue gains and could ultimately result in
Social Security paying Bill Gates millions of
dollars in retirement income. 
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Table 1
History of Wage Cap
Year Amount Year Amount 
1937–50 $3,000 1986 $42,000 
1951–54 $3,600 1987 $43,800 
1955–58 $4,200 1988 $45,000 
1959–65 $4,800 1989 $48,000 
1966–67 $6,600 1990 $51,300 
1968–71 $7,800 1991 $53,400 
1972 $9,000 1992 $55,500 
1973 $10,800 1993 $57,600 
1974 $13,200 1994 $60,600 
1975 $14,100 1995 $61,200 
1976 $15,300 1996 $62,700 
1977 $16,500 1997 $65,400 
1978 $17,700 1998 $68,400 
1979 $22,900 1999 $72,600 
1980 $25,900 2000 $76,200 
1981 $29,700 2001 $80,400 
1982 $32,400 2002 $84,900 
1983 $35,700 2003 $87,000 
1984 $37,800 2004 $87,900 
1985 $39,600 2005 $90,000 
Source: Social Security Administration.
Figure 1
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Source: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement 2004, Table 4.B1, http://www.ssa.gov/policy
/docs/statcomps/supplement/2004/4b.html.
The other alternative would be to increase
the tax cap without allowing workers to
accrue any additional benefits, turning Social
Security into even more of a welfare program
than it is today. As a result, even some sup-
porters of traditional Social Security have
been reluctant to embrace lifting the cap,
fearing that to do so would undermine the
program’s image as a broad-based, contribu-
tory social insurance program. Bill Clinton
warned against this approach at a 1998
forum hosted by the Concord Coalition and
AARP, pointing out that this change would
make Social Security “an actuarially negative
investment for the people involved, where
you’re just taxing people’s payroll far more
than they’ll ever get back, and they’re just
subsidizing the system.”9
The Consequences of 
Raising the Cap
Elimination of the payroll tax cap would be
the largest tax increase in U.S. history—more
than $472 billion in the first five years alone.
Even raising the cap to $150,000 per year
would amount to an overall tax hike of $106
billion over the first five years. Over 10 years,
the cost of raising the cap would be $384 bil-
lion and the cost of eliminating it would be an
astounding $1.3 trillion in new taxes.10 To put
this in perspective, Figure 2 compares the pro-
posed tax hike to the last three major tax
hikes: the 1982 increase in Social Security tax
rates, the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act (wherein President George H. W.
Bush broke his “read my lips” pledge), and the
1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993
(the Clinton tax hike of 1993).
As bad as that would be in the aggregate,
it would be even worse for individual work-
ers. A worker earning $100,000 per year
would directly or indirectly pay $1,240 more
in taxes each year. 
Moreover, as the above example shows,
raising the tax cap would not just impact the
super rich, as is often portrayed, but would fall
most heavily on the upper middle class.
Indeed, some 9.2 million Americans would see
their taxes increased. Roughly three-quarters
of those are managers or other professionals
such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers. But
roughly 16 percent work in sales or office
occupations, and the remainder includes
teachers, nurses, truck drivers, farmers, police
officers, and others.11 Nearly 60 percent of
those workers are between the ages of 35 and
55, and 20 percent are over 55 and nearing
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retirement.12
For all these working men and women, rais-
ing the cap would immediately increase their
marginal tax rate—the amount of taxes paid on
each additional dollar of income earned—by
roughly 10 percentage points (less than the full
12.4 percent because the employer’s half is tax-
deductible). Most of the affected workers are
already paying federal income taxes at the top
rate of 35 percent. Moreover, as Cato senior fel-
low Alan Reynolds has pointed out, the effec-
tive marginal tax rate for those workers is actu-
ally 2 to 3 percentage points higher than the 35
percent rate, because itemized deductions
begin to be phased out if income tops $142,700
and personal exemptions are phased out above
$214,050. Therefore these workers are already
paying marginal tax rates in the range of 42 per-
cent. And that doesn’t count state income taxes,
which can add approximately 5 percentage
points to marginal tax rates. Throw in the 2.9
percent Medicare tax, which is not capped, and
upper-income workers are already facing mar-
ginal tax rates of over 45 percent. That is, near-
ly half of every additional dollar earned is taken
in taxes.13
Adding 10 more percentage points by elimi-
nating the cap on Social Security taxes would
increase this to 55 percent. That would give the
United States one of the highest marginal tax
rates in the world, exceeding even such notori-
ously high-tax countries as Germany (47 per-
cent), and roughly equal to that of Sweden (56
percent).14
Small businesses would be particularly
hard hit. In fact, about one-third of the work-
ers affected by raising the cap would be small
business owners. Gene Steuerle of the Urban
Institute believes that an increase in the pay-
roll tax cap would have a disproportionate
impact on small businesses, because of the
difficulty in differentiating between earnings
from work and earnings from investment in
their businesses.15
Although there has been relatively little
analysis of the economic consequences of rais-
ing or eliminating the payroll tax cap, it seems
fair to assume that they would be consider-
able. For example, Edward Prescott, winner of
the 2004 Nobel Prize in economics, has com-
pared high-tax societies in Europe with the
United States and found that workers respond
to the incentives supplied by marginal tax
rates. The higher marginal tax rates in Europe
clearly discourage labor. In fact, Europeans
work a full 50 percent less than Americans.
That is a change from the early 1970s, when
individual Europeans worked nearly 50 per-
cent harder than Americans.16
Raising the tax cap is also likely to reduce
national savings, since the upper-income
households that would be subject to the
increased taxes are also those that do much
of the nation’s saving. More than 84 percent
of those in the top 10 percent of incomes
report saving during the previous year,
whereas fewer than a third of those in the
lowest 10 percent do.17
The Heritage Foundation estimates that
removing the cap would reduce the rate of
U.S. economic growth by 2–3 percent. Over
the next 10 years, it would cost the U.S. econ-
omy nearly $136 billion in lost growth. In
addition, roughly 1.1 million jobs would be
lost over the next 10 years.18
Yet, in exchange for this massive tax increase
and its attendant costs, Social Security would
gain very little. 
The Effect on Solvency
Advocates of removing the cap often
make grand claims about its impact on
Social Security solvency. For example, the
Economic Policy Institute suggests that elim-
ination of the cap would reduce Social
Security’s 75-year funding shortfall by as
much as 90 percent.19 However, those claims
are based on a fundamental fallacy: the
assumption that Social Security surpluses
accumulated today can be saved through the
Social Security Trust Fund.
Social Security payroll taxes are currently
bringing in more revenue than the program
pays out in benefits, a surplus that is project-
ed to continue until approximately 2017.
Thereafter, the situation will reverse, with
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Social Security paying out more in benefits
than it brings in through taxes. The surplus
is used to purchase special issue Treasury
bonds. When the bonds are purchased, the
Social Security surplus becomes general rev-
enue and is spent on the government’s annu-
al general operating expenses. What remains
behind in the Trust Fund are the bonds, plus
an interest payment attributed to the bonds
(also paid in bonds, rather than cash).
Government bonds are, in essence, a form of
IOU. They are a promise against future tax
revenue. When the bonds become due, the
government will have to repay them out of
the general revenue. 
Perhaps the clearest explanation appeared in
the Clinton administration’s FY 2000 budget:
These [Trust Fund] balances are available
to finance future benefit payments . . .
but only in a bookkeeping sense. . . . They
do not consist of real economic assets
that can be drawn down in the future to
fund benefits. Instead, they are claims on
the Treasury that, when redeemed, will
have to be financed by raising taxes, bor-
rowing from the public, or reducing ben-
efits or other expenditures. The existence
of large trust fund balances, therefore,
does not by itself have any impact on the
government’s ability to pay benefits.20
Adding more money to the Trust Fund
now would simply increase the number of
bonds. The money from purchase of those
bonds would revert to general revenue and be
spent. It is an endless cycle that does nothing
to change Social Security’s actual solvency.
A far better measure of Social Security’s
finances and the impact of changes such as
raising the tax cap is the annual cash-flow sur-
plus or deficit, that is, the yearly gap between
Social Security’s revenue and expenditures.
This is a measure of the amount of additional
revenue Congress will have to find—through
taxes, borrowing, or reductions in other
spending—if benefits are to be paid.
Figure 3 shows the current financial condi-
tion of Social Security. The program is run-
ning a surplus today, but by 2017 it will begin
to run a deficit.21 Those deficits continue to
increase, reaching 5.75 percent of payroll at
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Social Security Tax Payroll Surplus or Deficit
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the end of the 75-year actuarial period, and
continuing to grow outside thereafter. Overall,
Social Security’s unfunded obligations total
$5.7 trillion over the actuarial period and
$12.8 trillion over an infinite horizon.22
How would changing the tax cap affect the
fiscal balance? Figure 4 shows what would
happen if the tax cap were raised to $150,000,
approximately 90 percent of wages, while
allowing workers to continue accruing bene-
fits. There is almost no effect on Social
Security’s finances. The program begins to
run cash-flow deficits in 2021, just four years
later. At the end of the 75-year actuarial win-
dow, Social Security’s deficits are just over one-
half percent of payroll less than they would
have been without raising the cap.23
Moreover, this may actually overstate the
gain to Social Security’s finances. By dramati-
cally increasing marginal tax rates on incomes
above $90,000 per year, raising the cap would
create a strong incentive for workers to shift
assets from wages to income that is taxed at a
lower rate, such as capital gains or dividends.
While the Social Security Administration’s
actuarial estimates attempt to adjust for such
income shifting, many observers believe that
the impact could be larger than assumed by
SSA’s actuaries.24 For instance, Harvard econo-
mist Martin Feldstein estimates that this would
cut income reported by about 7 percent as a
result of reduced effort and increased tax avoid-
ance.25
Eliminating the cap obviously brings in
more revenue than simply raising it, but far
less than many believe. As Figure 5 shows, the
date Social Security begins running deficits
would move to 2024, a gain of just 7 years,
while the shortfall in 2080 would be reduced
from 5.75 percent of payroll to 4 percent.26 In
other words, even after the largest tax increase
in U.S. history, the program would still require
a tax hike equal to a one-third increase in the
payroll tax in order to pay promised benefits. 
The most extreme proposal would be to
eliminate the cap and not provide any addi-
tional credit toward benefits (Figure 6). The
program would continue running surpluses
until 2025, eight years longer than current
projections, but would still fall into deficit
thereafter. This move would cut the shortfall
in 2080 by a little less than half, but it would
still exceed 3 percent of payroll.27
Thus, even the most drastic option does
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Social Security’s Payroll Tax Surplus or Deficit (eliminate cap, credit for additional benefits)
Source: Social Security Administration.
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Social Security’s Payroll Tax Surplus or Deficit (eliminate cap, no additional benefits)
Source: Social Security Administration.
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not come close to restoring Social Security to
long-term solvency. Even more important,
under every one of these options, at the end of
the 75-year actuarial period the trend line is
down, indicating that Social Security’s solven-
cy will continue to deteriorate in the future.
Quite simply, we can’t tax our way out of
Social Security’s problems.
The Real Issues of Social 
Security Reform
It is also important to realize that Social
Security’s problems are not just a matter of
financing. While restoring Social Security to
permanent sustainable solvency is an impor-
tant goal of any reform, it should not be the
only goal. Rather, Social Security reform
should be seen as an opportunity to fix many
of the underlying problems with the system.
The first of these is ownership. Under the
current Social Security system, Americans have
no ownership rights to their benefits. In 1960
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
Flemming v. Nestor that Social Security was just
another tax-and-spend program, no more spe-
cial than corporate welfare or farm subsidies.
Social Security “contributions” are a tax, the
Court ruled, “benefits” just another spending
program, and taxpayers have no legally enforce-
able claim to the payment of such benefits.28
This lack of ownership leads directly to
another problem with the current Social
Security system: a lack of inheritability.
Although the current Social Security system
does provide survivors’ benefits for children
under age 18, millions of workers who die
prematurely are unable to pass along a legacy
to their loved ones. Social Security as it is
structured today is, essentially, a 100 percent
death tax. This is of particular importance to
African Americans, the poor, and others with
shorter life expectancies. 
And, finally, it is important to realize that
Social Security taxes are already so high com-
pared with benefits that the program has
become an increasingly bad deal for younger
workers, providing a low, below-market rate
of return. Indeed, on average, younger work-
ers can expect a return on their taxes of less
than 2 percent. For the upper-income work-
ers likely to be affected by raising or eliminat-
ing the cap, the expected rate of return from
Social Security is likely to be less than one-
half of 1 percent.29
Raising taxes will do nothing to resolve
these problems. It will not give workers own-
ership and control over their money. It will
not allow low- and middle-income workers to
accumulate a nest egg of real, inheritable
wealth. It will not improve Social Security’s
rate of return for younger workers. In fact, for
those upper-income workers subject to the
tax increase, it will make their already dismal
rate of return even worse. In many cases, it
would make that return negative.
A Better Alternative
Rather than increasing taxes, we should
allow younger workers to privately invest a
portion of their Social Security taxes through
personal accounts.
And, although personal accounts would
not by themselves solve all of Social Security’s
financial problems, combined with other
measures they could do far more to restore
the program to solvency than could increas-
ing the payroll tax cap.
For example, compare the most radical
proposal, complete elimination of the cap and
no additional benefits, with legislation intro-
duced by Reps. Sam Johnson (R-TX) and Jeff
Flake (R-AZ), which was based on the Cato
Institute’s “6.2 Percent Solution” (Figure 7).30
The Johnson-Flake bill (HR 530) would allow
workers under age 55 to save their half of the
Social Security payroll tax (6.2 percent of
wages) through individual accounts and
would change the Social Security benefit for-
mula from a wage index to a price index. 
The Johnson-Flake bill restores Social
Security to permanent sustainable solvency.31
Eliminating the cap does not. In fact, at the end
of the 75-year actuarial period, Social Security
without a cap on taxable earnings would still
9
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be facing a shortfall equal to 3 percent of pay-
roll, whereas the Johnson-Flake bill would be
running a surplus equal to 3 percent of payroll.
Given that the Johnson-Flake bill also deals
with Social Security’s other problems—it
would give workers ownership and control
over their retirement funds; allow workers to
build a nest egg of real, inheritable wealth; and
provide higher benefits than Social Security
can currently pay—it clearly represents a better
approach to Social Security reform. Other
proposals for personal accounts would also be
a significant improvement over proposals to
raise or eliminate the cap.32
Conclusion
Social Security is insolvent. The troubled
retirement program will begin running deficits
in just 12 years and is facing unfunded obliga-
tions of roughly $12.8 trillion. The options for
reform are limited. As then president Bill
Clinton pointed out, the only choices are to
raise taxes, cut benefits, or invest privately.33
That has led some observers to propose raising
or even eliminating the cap on the amount of
wages subject to the Social Security payroll tax.
Such a massive tax hike—the largest in
U.S. history—would have serious conse-
quences for both taxpayers and the U.S. econ-
omy. However, it would do relatively little for
Social Security’s solvency. Even the most
drastic and politically unlikely proposal,
complete elimination of the cap without
allowing any additional credit toward bene-
fits, would gain just eight extra years of cash-
flow solvency for the program. More widely
discussed proposals, such as increasing the
cap to 90 percent of covered wages (around
$150,000 per year), would extend the date by
which Social Security begins to run a deficit
by just three years and would have only an
insignificant effect on the program’s long-
term unfunded obligations.
Nor would this enormous tax increase
address Social Security’s other problems. It
would not give workers ownership and con-
trol over their money. It would not allow low-
and middle-income workers to accumulate a
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nest egg of real, inheritable wealth. It would
not improve Social Security’s rate-of-return
for younger workers. 
At the same time, proposals for personal
accounts would give workers ownership and
control over their retirement funds. And, com-
bined with measures to restrain benefit growth,
they can do far more for Social Security’s sol-
vency than would eliminating the cap. 
In the end, proposals for changing the tax-
able wage cap are all pain and no gain. With a
viable alternative—creating personal accounts—
Congress should not go down this road.
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